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RONALD KNOX AND JOSEPH RUSSO 
Agamemnon's Test: Iliad 2.73-75 
Je@Ota 6' ycLv E3TJEOIV 3TELQTIooCLat, T OEItg1S EOTI, 
xac qcPEVYEV oiUV VTIVOi JokVUXXliotl xEXeVo-. 
vEtSig 6' aXXkofev &kkog E@QT)TVELV CEEootV. 
(Iliad, 2.73-75) 
IN HIS RECENT COMMENTARY G. S. Kirk writes a long note to try to make 
sense of Agamemnon's announcement, quoted above, that he will "first test [the 
troops] with words" before initiating the battle in which he expects to capture 
Troy that day (QIatL xeivW, 37).1 Agamemnon has received a dream from Zeus 
the night before (AL6g 6e tot ay&yEX e kit, 26 = 63) telling him to arm the men 
and begin the attack, for now finally all Olympus is united on his side (11-13 = 
28-30 = 65-67). In the morning he holds a closed meeting of his general staff, to 
whom he reports verbatim the message of the dream and then adds lines 73-75, 
the statement about first applying a test. 
This passage has never been satisfactorily explained, and Professor Kirk 
calls the proposed test "quite unexpected."2 Yet we hear Nestor, speaking in 
R.K. would like to dedicate his share of this article to Professor David Daube. 
1. A Commentary to Homer's Iliad, I-IV (Cambridge, 1985) 122-23. 
2. Ibid. M. M. Willcock (A Companion to the Iliad [Chicago, 1976] 18) says, "There is some 
confusion here." Cf. further Cedric Whitman: "The troops do not know what [Agamemnon] is up 
to-and neither do most of the commentators" (The Heroic Paradox, ed. C. Segal [Ithaca, N.Y., 
1982] 73). J. T. Sheppard (The Pattern of the Iliad [London, 1922] 26) saw Agamemnon's conduct as 
the "sign of a disturbed mind. .... He is in the grip of Ate." Richmond Lattimore thinks he has 
"believed his own falsehoods" (The Iliad of Homer [Chicago, 1959] 49). Other critics have appreci 
? 1989 Ronald Knox and Joseph Russo 
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reply to Agamemnon, express considerable astonishment at the message of the 
dream (80-81), but none whatsoever at the further proposal of testing the men 
first-about which, as Kirk observes, the dream itself had said nothing. The 
possibility Kirk holds out, that Agamemnon's test may be understood in connec 
tion with Odysseus's famous and seemingly gratuitous testing of his father on 
returning to Ithaca (Od. 24.239ff.), is of no use. This latter episode is, of course, 
a peculiar and intimate expression of Odysseus's character, whereas Agamem 
non's testing is, as he indicates, a matter here of fixed public rule-which is 
presumably why the proposal causes no surprise to Nestor or the other high 
counselors. 
Agamemnon's testing is not quite as absurd as Kirk supposes. Agamemnon 
does not, in the hour before what he understands will be the decisive, victorious 
battle of the war, simply "order" (Kirk's word) his army to sail home. He 
"urges" or "bids" (xEVXecw, 74) the men to go, bidding them be "persuaded" 
that they cannot win (Jx?cL0dcE0a tna6vTe, 139), and that they should give up and 
take the coward's way out ((pevyWcoev, 140). If Agamemnon's maneuver appears 
inexplicable, it is because Homer, assuming we already understand, does not 
trouble to underscore the setting of this test or make explicit the themis on which 
it is based. 
Readers of the Bible will sense what institution and setting have come into 
play here: it is the dismissal of cowards from the assembled ranks of the army 
immediately prior to engagement in Holy War. We see the rule at work in the 
famous story of Gideon in the Book of Judges, chapter 7, and it is given 
legislative form in Deuteronomy 20:8.3 Classicists will doubtless be reluctant to 
ated the irony inherent in the fact that Agamemnon's test turns into a testing of his own leadership 
(e.g., C. R. Beye, The Iliad, the Odyssey, and the Epic Tradition [Garden City, N.Y., 1966] 123), but 
find his maneuver "totally implausible, awkwardly worked in" (ibid.; cf. J. C. Hogan, A Guide to the 
Iliad [Garden City, N.Y., 1979] 92): "Why Agamemnon adds this proposal is hard to say"). E. T. 
Owen (The Story of the Iliad [Ann Arbor, 1966] 21) looks for a motive grounded in narrative impact 
on the audience: Homer "wishes to surprise his audience, to give them something to wonder at, and 
want to hear the outcome of." The most sophisticated explanation in terms of Homeric narrative 
strategy is that of Cedric Whitman, Homer and the Heroic Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1958) 58 
with n. 13: Agamemnon states "the opposite of what he hopes and believes to be true, to see if the 
gods will intervene," a kind of divination by opposites, of which Whitman claims Odyssey 15.521 to 
be the closest example (Telemachus calls Eurymachus the man most likely to succeed his father as 
king in order to solicit the omen that follows and points to the contrary). Whitman is right to say that 
Agamemnon means the opposite of what he proposes in the speech to his men. But there is no 
further omen for the king to solicit, since he has just been sent a complete and clear verbal message 
from Zeus (as we have thrice heard: 11-13 = 28-30 = 65-67). Telemachus, who has heard nothing 
and feels forsaken and forgotten, is making a sad last appeal. In short, the theological situation (not 
to mention the religious disposition) of Agamemnon is diametrically opposite that of Telemachus. 
Agamemnon's test is directed at the men, not at heaven. He characterizes the test as 0etL;, and this is 
what has to be explained. Cf. W. Donlan, "Homer's Agamemnon," CW 65 (1971) 111-12; and Eric 
Vogelin, Order and History II, The World of the Polis (Baton Rouge, La., 1957) 80-81. 
3. In Deuteronomy and Homer the test and dismissal of cowards is administered by way of 
public address. In Judges 7 we have as well the arcane command to bring the men down to the river 
to see how they drink: vide David Daube, "Gideon's Few," Journal of Jewish Studies (1956) 155 
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apply the notion of "Holy War" to the well-greaved Achaeans, but the Holy 
Wars of ancient Israel are not to be anachronistically confused with medieval 
crusades or the Thirty Years' War: they did not necessarily entail war against 
the religion of the enemy.4 The definition of Holy War did not require infidels. 
It required simply that the summons to war-and thus the assurance of 
victory-come from God Himself. This is precisely what has occurred in Aga 
memnon's dream. 
It is Agamemnon's dream that creates the new circumstance for the battle he 
is now ordered to initiate, different from the previous nine years of intermittent 
engagement. At this moment it becomes Holy War, and a fundamental rule of 
Holy War imposes itself: the dismissal in shame of any cowards, of any who have 
no heart for the battle or no faith in the god commanding it.5 Agamemnon's 
decision to test the men first is not the impulse of erratic generalissimo, but 
compulsory themis.6 
61. The fundamental book on Holy War in the Bible is Gerhard von Rad, Der heilige Krieg im alten 
Israel (Zurich, 1951). F. Schwally, Semitische Kriegsaltertiimer I (Leipzig, 1901) 96-98, is an early 
attempt to point to the anthropological setting. Manfred Weippert, " 'Heiliger Krieg' in Israel und 
Assyrien: Kritische Anmerkungen zu Gerhard von Rads Konzept .. .," Zeitschrift fur Alttesta 
mentliche Wissenschaft (1972) 460-93) is in search of extra-Biblical parallels, and though he cites 
nothing specific to Dt. 20:8 and no Homeric verse, his sweeping conclusion (p. 485) may be heard: 
"wer also von 'Jahwekrieg' spricht, muss ebenso von Assurkrieg oder Istarkrieg reden, und man 
braucht nur an die homerischen Epen oder r6mische Kriegspraktiken zu denken, um noch weitere 
Termini dieser Art hinzubilden zu konnen. In Wirklichkeit reden wir hier von gemein 
orientalischer, ja gemeinantiker Kriegspraxis und -ideologie." Unfortunately, there is no discussion 
of Hittite material in this connection. We must hope for scholars of Hittite languages and sources 
to look for instances where a great god summons soldiers to victory. Fritz Stolz (Jahwes und Israels 
Kriege, Abhandlungen zur Theologie des Alten und Neuen Testaments 60 [Zurich, 1972] 27, cf. 
119) is undecided whether to regard the rule in Dt. 20:8 as a literary invention of Deuteronomy or 
a reformation of more ancient traditional practice. The first view is unambiguously held by Alexan 
der Rof6, "The Laws of War in Deuteronomy: Their Origin, Intention and Positivity," Zion 39 
(1974) 143-56 (in Hebrew with English summary). Rad's caveat (op. cit. 72) applies here: 
"Indessen ist zu fragen, ob etwas, das literarisch sekundar ist, auch in der Geschichte eine 
zweitrangige oder problematische Existenz haben muss. Sind doch schon die literarkritischen 
Urteile von den Formgeschichtlichen zu trennen, denn selbst hinter spaten und ausgesprochen 
theoretisierenden Texten sind wirklich geiibte kultische Brauche zum Vorschein gekommen." In 
deed, the question of what is ideal construct and what is actual practice is just as tricky when put to 
"the Trojan War." 
4. Rad (supra n. 3) 32. 
5. Ibid. 47: "Am alten heiligen Krieg konnten nur Glaubige teilnehmen. Mit ihren Glauben 
trugen sie von Anfang bis zum Ende das Geschehen." David Daube ("The Culture of Deuteron 
omy," Orita 3 [Ibadan, 1969] 29) alerts us to the rule's efficacy as an appeal to the sense of shame. 
The permission for cowards to be dismissed is preceded by the divine assurance of victory (Dt. 20:8 is 
preceded by the assurance of Dt. 20:3-4). "After this, it is surely evident that disgrace awaits 
whoever slips away from faintheartedness and fear. Conversely, glory will be in store for those who, 
though offered the opportunity of opting out, do stay to fight: acceptance, favour, honour are the 
great rewards in a shame culture." As we shall see, Agamemnon's speech to the men is an extremely 
subtle (in the event, oversubtle) attempt to exploit the "shame-cultural" nature of the rule against its 
theological premise of full confidence in the divinity. 
6. The same themis is probably alluded to again in the grand digression by which Nestor 
insinuates his fateful proposal to Patroclus in Book 11. Reminiscing on his part long ago in the wars 
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At the end of a subtle examination of the story in Judges of Gideon's test 
of his forces before battle with the Midianites, Professor David Daube notes, 
"We must remember that oracles often fell in with the plans of him in charge."7 
What we have in Homer in the passage under notice is the clear-sighted obser 
vation of how Agamemnon seeks to make his way around the rule that, being 
commanded by Zeus to attack in reliance on the united support of Olympus, he 
must first dismiss any cowards, any unwilling warriors, from the ranks of his 
army. The event is comic; Agamemnon is made a fool of, and the poet allows 
us to see far more of the human chicanery that can go on in the application of 
the high rules of war and religion than Judges or Deuteronomy would grant us. 
The scene reaches its climax in what can almost be called cartoon comedy, with 
Agamemnon left presiding before a cloud of suspended dust as the men have 
all instantly rushed off to the boats to go home; and the "cry that reaches 
heaven" is in this case not a blood-curdling war cry against Troy, but the joy of 
the Achaeans under the impression that they are being allowed to call the 
whole thing off (149-54). 
Uplifted as he is by the message from Zeus, Agamemnon is nonetheless 
loath to risk losing a single man in the required dismissal of cowards. In the 
closed session with his chief counselors Agamemnon had reported the divine 
message, announced that he would apply the consequent test in the form of a 
public speech, and then ordered that they, his captains in the know, should 
position themselves in the assembly to make sure no one actually left (75). Aga 
memnon is the commander of an invasionary force that for nine years has been 
virtually confined to its initial beachhead. He will now go into battle without 
Achilles, and he means not to lose another man. His sense of weakness insuffi 
ciently relieved by religion, he hatches an unmitigated deception. 
We know from having heard the dream message three times that Agamem 
non's grand address is a brazen lie from top to bottom. He formally gives out to 
the men as their commander's considered assessment of Zeus' will in this war 
between the Epeians and his own Pylians, he tells how the enemy was massing against the frontier 
town of Thryoessa, but Athens herself came to summon up a Pylian army to the rescue (11.714-17): 
tLt L 6' 'AOeiY 
ayyeXoSg ikXe Ofovo' jn' 'OX.u[Aov 9OwQejooEo0oa 
Evvuxog, o06' &exovrn nHvov x6ra Xabv iyeLQev, 
&dakkX& aX' eooavtvovg JtoEXitEIv. 
Athena acts as a "nocturnal messenger" of her own and Zeus's summons; we are presumably to 
understand that she came to Neleus in a dream, like the dream sent to Agamemnon. Nothing is said 
of a test, but the emphasis over the two lines that Athena's summons "gathered from across Pylos" 
what is "not an unwilling army, but men eager to fight," certainly leaves ample room for the 
exclusion or dismissal of the unwilling. 
7. "Gideon's Few" (supra n. 3) 160. 
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precisely the opposite of what the dream messenger had said (114-15). It is a 
classic case of manipulation, for he is really trying to stir the men to do the 
opposite of what he is ostensibly proposing. He underscores with all due clarity 
consistent with the fraud that he himself approves of this step, that in going home 
now he and they will be disgraced in the eyes of their women, children, and 
future generations (119-22). The height of Agamemnon's eloquence is attained 
in the elaborate, imaginative, circumstantial way he conveys to the troops that, 
as far as the Trojans proper are concerned, exclusive of allies, the Achaeans 
outnumber them ten to one (123-30). In fact, alluding to the original omens at 
the departure of the expedition, Agamemnon's claim that it is evident now that 
what Zeus had then promised and "nodded assent to" (xaxTevEoev, 112) was 
only a "cheat" (artraITIv, 114) is patently meant to be so offensive, so flagrantly 
contradictory to religious axiom8 as to provoke indignation and protest. With his 
culminating exhortation, JTELOtd)?0a rdavxeg (139), "let us all be persuaded" to 
decamp and go home, Agamemnon is directly soliciting a response from the 
men-namely, outraged rejection of his invitation to shame. (Perhaps his cap 
tains sprinkled in the assembly were to have been of better help here, but things 
moved too quickly.) 
Agamemnon's scheme is to turn the required dismissal of cowards into the 
proposition that the entire army take dismissal in this way. He could, of course, 
have proudly broadcast to all the men the great summons and promise from Zeus 
he actually received, and then parenthetically have bid anyone craven enough 
among them to slink off in shame even in the eyes of children and grandchildren: 
such soldiers are not needed when all Olympus is on our side! Doing so, how 
ever, Agamemnon would be tipping off the men that at this point by religious 
law they do in fact individually have the choice whether to leave or to stay.9 In 
proposing instead, "let us all slink off in disgrace, we can never prevail against 
the Trojans, Zeus has abandoned us," he is sticking to the letter of the law, 
inviting cowards to leave; but by withholding from the men the premise of the 
offer of dismissal (Zeus's command to battle and assurance of victory) he expects 
he is withholding the possibility of the offer's being accepted. Not only can the 
men not recognize application here of the themis in question, but the arguments 
Agamemnon presents make it only sensible for the whole army to give up the 
fight. He does this with the calculation that, since it is inconceivable, of course, 
that the entire army should admit failure and accept disgrace, therefore every 
8. Cf. Zeus's words at 1.526-27: 
o6 ya@Q eov jtakXvdyQETov oM6' &Jrar'qbv 
o0i6' aTEXETnTIOV, 6 Ti XEV XE(atkn xaTaVElio. 
9. The men's confidence in the deity summoning them to battle is inextricable from their 
confidence in the veracity of the leader reporting the deity's will, and in this regard it was noticeable 
(79) that not even Agamemnon's best supporter, Nestor, believed easily in his dream. 
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man in the army-the dismissal of cowards having been offered and rebuffed en 
masse-will be consequently bound to persevere. It is a magnificent instance of 
twisting the law without breaking it. To evade the legal consequence of the 
principle that gods do not want or need unwilling warriors in their armies, 
Agamemnon has translated the promise of victory he received from Olympus 
into the public announcement "Zeus has forsaken us." 
The climax of the episode is the men's response to Agamemnon's grand 
deception. Naturally, therefore, Homer delays revealing just what that response 
is for seven lines, during which we are given similes of the winds rippling the sea 
or a field of ripe corn to describe the army's taking in what Agamemnon has 
propounded (142-49). These similies might signify as well the intake of breath 
for the resounding "No" Agamemnon is counting on. But then Homer does 
indicate that the mass assembly has heard just what it wanted to hear, and 
Agamemnon's machination backfires in a cloud of dust. 
Forty lines later, as the work of putting the war back on track is just getting 
under way, Odysseus is collaring soldiers left and right.'1 We may laugh again as 
he must stiffly explain to one departing officer who he knows is no coward, "You 
have not yet clearly perceived the mind of the son of Atreus" (192). The lord of 
men will be angry that the sons of the Achaeans have taken him at his word. The 
debacle is only resolved three hundred lines after the dust cloud by means of the 
more magical dashing around of Athene, who pours into each Achaean warrior's 
heart (xdor .t.. . xaQ6in/, 451) the inspiration that it is sweeter to fight the war 
than to sail back to his own fatherland. Agamemnon's manipulation to make the 
10. A preliminary reader for this journal points to Odysseus's ringing aphorism: oix ayao6v 
jroXvxoLoaQtvi- Eig xoiQavog; ago (204), and the light hand with which Homer indicates that it is in 
fact only Odysseus (on behalf of Agamemnon, to be sure) who is the one exercising command in his 
effort to roll back the anarchy caused by the one high commander's grand address: 5g 6 ye 
xoloaveov 6iEjtcE ? OQCITO (207). Odysseus's aphorism had an important subsequent history. Placed 
on the crest of an impassioned summation against dualism in Book 12 of Aristotle's Metaphysics, it 
further became an elegant feature of Jewish and Christian vindications of monotheism (Erik Peter 
son, "Der Monotheismus als Politisches Problem," Theologische Traktate [Munich, 1950] 49, 65. We 
thank Prof. Gerard Casparty for the reference and discussion). This subsequent history of the line 
reinforces the likelihood of its having had a considerable prehistory, for it is precisely as an aphorism 
or proverb that it has its effect in Homer's tale. The desirability of one ruler rather than many is 
clearly not a perception to which Odysseus has just attained at this moment while actually observing 
Agamemnon at work. It is a preexisting argument he seizes upon in the crisis, and only therefore can 
it have its amusing, ironic, secondary effect. David Daube has noted that a very similar adage is 
voiced in Judges 9:2 at the end of the saga of Gideon, in which we first observed dismissal of cowards 
(Sons and Strangers [Boston, 1984) 5). In his polygamous time Gideon has had seventy sons, who 
now inherit his tremendous authority and esteem. He has also left one illegitimate son, Abimelek, by 
a Canaanite concubine. Abimelek persuades the Shechemites (Canaanites) to join in a massacre of 
the seventy and make him king: mah toy lakem hamashol bakem shiv 'im 'ish kol bene Yerubaal 'im 
meshol bakem 'ish 'ehad ("What good for you is the rule of seventy men, all the sons of [Gideon] over 
you, if ruling by one man over you [is available]?"). The nearness of this line to Iliad 2.204, not only 
in content but in phrasing, is astonishing. Odysseus has in fact supplied the proverbial answer to 
Abimelek's rhetorical question: "What good [mah tov]?" "No good [oux aya0o6v!" 
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divine message fall in with his own interest has led to the perfect disintegration of 
the broad army of the Achaeans. (The mordant backtalk of Thersites exemplifies 
the disintegration.) It must be reconstituted piecemeal, man by man. The Cata 
logue of Ships is a fitting coda to this work of repair, so that at the beginning of 
Book 3 things are back to the state they were in before Zeus sent Agamemnon 
the dream. 
Agamemnon's test, then, is the complicating incident of a rich and long 
delaying episode in the tale of the war, and we carry away from it impressions 
that should color what is to come. Zeus had calculated how to fulfill his thun 
derous, firm promise to Thetis (1.505ff.) and sent false assurances and a direct 
order to Agamemnon to attack the Trojans; Agamemnon, calculating for his 
part how even better to assure the success of the attack, then delivered his 
address to the troops with the consequence that the calculations of both failed. 
Indeed, when battle finally is joined-not, in fact, until the end of Book 4-it 
is, of course, not at all at the signal of Agamemnon at the command of Zeus, 
but at the "thoughtless" (a&qpovL, 4.104) and misguided (4.129-30) bowshot of 
the Trojan archer Pandarus. Although Homer reminds us even as Agamem 
non's army is dissolving that this war is fated to be fought to its well-known 
conclusion (2.155-56), he has had us observe, by way of introduction before we 
see fighting, that the war nevertheless escapes the control and calculation of 
even the most supreme commanders. 
But quite apart from the early light this episode sheds on the story as a 
whole, and quite apart from the larger issues that the episode introduces-the 
extent, for instance, to which Agamemnon is being inadvertently truthful in 
deviously proposing that Zeus is a cheat, or the irony of the chief god's deception 
failing because of the chief king's lack of faith-what we have on the simplest 
level is an extended political expose. Consider the splendid formality of the 
convocation (96-98), and the magnificent scepter that commands the attention 
of the audience for ten lines (100-109). Then consider the enormity of solemn 
deceit, on the highest authority and in the name of religion, that the poet lays 
bare for us in this primordial public assembly. 
To conclude: it is our contention that the themis in line 73 refers to a rule 
very similar to Dt. 20:8, because this hypothesis makes clear sense of the 
episode in all detail. The existence of such a rule in both Homer and the Bible 
may be explained perhaps by the impingement of a common third cultural force 
(see n. 3) or by the inherent theological and anthropological cogency of the 
rule in question. (Gods tend to require willing subjection from their proteges; 
an impasse in warfare-which might occasion a god to step in and take 
command-may well require the tradeoff of sheer numbers of soldiers for the 
heightened courage or fanaticism of a self-selecting elite.) As we could expect, 
the treatment of the rule is radically different in the Bible and in Homer. 
Nevertheless, the hypothesis that it is essentially the same rule makes clear and 
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direct sense of the entire episode of Agamemnon's Test in all detail. We 
therefore reject the standard explanation toward which Professor Kirk inclines 
in a further note," that the test follows the dream only because of the awk 
ward, illogical conflation of variant versions available in the epic tradition.12 
Berwyn, Pennsylvania 
and Haverford College 
11. Commentary (supra n. 1) 124-25, note to line 86. 
12. See Walter Leaf, ed., The Iliad I (London, 1900) 46-47; and E. R. Dodds, "Homer," in 
Fifty Years of Classical Scholarship, ed. M. Platnauer (Oxford, 1954), 16. 
CORRECTION 
In the April 1989 issue of Classical Antiquity, (Volume 8, 
No. 1), the last line of text on page 87 should read: 
"...creatures should be understood as attributes or domesti 
cated companions of the goddess in her..." 
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